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This document, issued by DirectDemocracyS (DDS) , presents a critical analysis of the current political, economic, financial and social situation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, based on documented and up-to-date data from international and independent sources, followed by a comprehensive detailed program for implementing the global direct democracy system in Jordan, in order to achieve for every Jordanian citizen, and for every component of Jordanian society, a real, full, continuous, direct, rapid, efficient, safe and protected participation in public decision-making .

This document is not a passing political statement, but a detailed, realistic, and practically applicable roadmap, based on logic, common sense, and an in-depth study of the Jordanian reality with all its geographical, demographic, and regional complexities .

DDS methodology

The DDS approach Based on four principles that do not change regardless of the national context :

National wealth, in all its forms — water, phosphate, potash, land, financial resources, and public property — must always remain exclusively the property of the Jordanian people, and shall not be exploited, managed, or distributed except by a direct and transparent popular decision .
The power to decide the future of the country must return, permanently, to the people themselves, through direct democratic mechanisms that are not subject to partisan, tribal, or clientelist mediation, or to the influence of external forces .
The transition to this system must be entirely peaceful, gradual, intelligent, and safe, through a small group structure, without any form of violence, confrontation, or destabilization .
Full and lasting respect for the Jordanian identity in all its diversity : the Hashemite throne and its historical and religious symbolism, the tribal fabric, the Palestinian component, the Christian, Circassian and Chechen minorities, the Islamic religion and its sects, and every political or opposition movement, including those movements that have been prevented from political activity .

DDS It does not impose a ready-made model from the outside, nor does it seek to replace Jordan’s identity, history, or symbols; rather, it places in the hands of the Jordanian people themselves the tools that enable them to decide, daily and directly, the fate of their wealth and the future of their country, with efficiency, knowledge, and security .

Why Jordan? And why now?

Jordan stands today at a historic crossroads : public debt exceeding 92 As a percentage of GDP, overall unemployment is close to 21% % and youth unemployment exceeds 40 Jordan faces a water crisis that is among the most severe globally, a structural dependence on foreign aid, a political system where the palace monopolizes most decision-making power despite the existence of an elected parliament, and escalating regional pressures stemming from the Gaza war, tensions in the West Bank, and the reinstatement of mandatory military service . This is not a passing crisis, but rather a structural accumulation requiring a structural solution, not merely the repeated cosmetic reforms that Jordan has witnessed since 1989. Without changing the fundamental equation of power .

At the same time, Jordan possesses exceptional strengths : an educated and young population, a strategic geographic location, relative security compared to its neighbors, and an administrative and institutional legacy that can be built upon rather than dismantled . This program does not call for a revolution or a coup, but rather for a gradual and peaceful transition towards a genuine, direct democracy that preserves the positive aspects of the Jordanian state and fundamentally addresses its shortcomings .

Part One : A Critical Analysis of the Current Situation

This section offers a frank and unbiased diagnosis of the Jordanian reality, based on data from independent international institutions ( the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI ), and United Nations agencies ). DDS He neither flatters nor exaggerates : the goal is an accurate understanding of the problem as a first step towards a real solution .

1.1 Political system : Executive monarchy under a parliamentary guise

Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy in which King Abdullah II enjoys broad executive powers : appointing and dismissing the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and appointing the 65 members of the Senate ( the upper house ). With full membership, the king appoints the heads of the army and security services and dissolves parliament unilaterally . The elected House of Representatives, despite its symbolic importance, lacks the power to form a government, as the king continues to choose the prime minister alone, contrary to repeated promises since 2011. Moving on to " parliamentary governments ".

2024 elections It took place under a new electoral law that allocated 41 one seat out of 138 For national party lists, in an attempt to strengthen political parties .
The Islamic Action Front ( the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood ) won the largest parliamentary bloc ( 31 seats). (seats ) , benefiting from popular sympathy for Gaza, but it represents less than a quarter of the seats and has no real ability to form a government or impose legislation .
In April 2025 The government has banned the Muslim Brotherhood in its entirety ( the parent organization, not the party ) , claiming its involvement in security plots, in a move described by human rights organizations as a dangerous escalation against the largest organized opposition movement in the country .
The voter turnout did not exceed approximately 30% Percent in the 2020 elections And 2024 , which is a clear indication of the loss of public confidence in the usefulness of the electoral process .
The Economist magazine ranked Jordan is among the " authoritarian " regimes in the 2024 Democracy Index , the lowest possible ranking .
Parties based on ethnicity, religion, or gender are prohibited, and the formation of new parties requires the approval of the Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs and the Independent Electoral Commission, with documented reports of institutional intimidation against those attempting to establish independent parties .
The electoral districts are historically drawn in a way that gives greater representational weight to areas with a tribal majority loyal to the regime, at the expense of areas with a high Palestinian population density, even though Jordanians of Palestinian origin constitute a majority or close to a majority of the population .

The paradox of suspended reform

Since assuming power in 1999 , King Abdullah II has repeatedly promised radical political reform : statements in 1999 On the idea that " the sky's the limit " for democracy, a 2013 promise By transitioning to a " fully parliamentary government , " he promised that Jordan would become a " British-style constitutional monarchy " under the Crown Prince . More than a quarter of a century later, neither of these promises has been substantially fulfilled . The Royal Commission for Political Modernization, formed in 2021, It produced new electoral laws and parties, but it did not touch the core of the palace's executive power .

This recurring pattern of " reform from above " that does not change the structure of power is precisely what proves the need for a radically different mechanism : a direct democracy built from the ground up through small groups, that does not wait for a mandate from above and does not clash with it .

Corruption and weak local governance

Multiple reports ( BTI Index 2026 , field reports ) indicate that administrative corruption remains widespread, particularly in the water and public procurement sectors, and that more than half of the pumped water is lost due to theft, network leaks, and mismanagement in a country considered one of the world's most water-scarce . Administrative decentralization, proposed as a solution, has failed to address the core of the problem, as creating additional local elected positions without mechanisms for direct public accountability does not reduce corruption but may even entrench it at a lower level .

1.2 Economics and Public Finance : The Spiral of Debt and External Dependence

The Jordanian economy has been suffering from structural imbalances since the 1990s : chronic low growth, a twin deficit ( budget and current account ) , and a continuous rise in public debt despite successive austerity programs linked to IMF agreements .

Index	Present value ( 2024-2026 data )
Public debt as a percentage of GDP	Approximately 92 percent ( compared to 74) (percentage in 2018 )
nominal GDP	Approximately 53.4 One billion dollars ( 2024 )
per capita GDP	Approximately 4,693 Dollars ( less than half the global average )
economic growth rate	2.3 – 2.8 Percentage annually, insufficient to absorb new entrants into the labor market
overall unemployment rate	About 21 percent ( 2024 )
Youth unemployment	Over 40 percent
Budget deficit	Approximately 5.2 – 5.5 % of GDP ( end of 2024 )
Public debt service	It consumes about 12 Percentage of government revenue annually on average
annual US aid	1.45 One billion dollars ( 2023-2029 agreement ) , along with Gulf support

A fragile and unproductive economic structure

Services constitute approximately 60 Percentage of GDP, compared to 25% for industry and mining. Percentage and cultivation not exceeding 5 Percent, which makes the economy vulnerable to shocks from tourism and private consumption without a solid production base .
Tourism, which provides more than 10 A percentage of GDP, it is severely and frequently affected by regional unrest; visitor numbers declined in the first months of Because of the Iranian - Israeli war , the fragility of relying on a single geopolitically sensitive sector is revealed .
Remittances from Jordanians working abroad represent approximately 9% Percent of the GDP, it is a vital resource but outside national control and linked to the conditions of the Gulf labor markets .
Government-owned companies, most notably the National Electricity Company and the Water Authority, are recording chronic losses approaching 2 A percentage of the GDP annually is borne by the taxpayer without any real structural reform in its management .
The unemployment rate among university graduates and women is much higher than the general rate, which means that national investment in education is not translating into real economic opportunities — a clear waste of human capital .

Who holds the economic decision-making power?

Major economic decisions in Jordan—austerity programs, water and electricity tariffs, taxes, and international economic partnership agreements such as the Comprehensive Partnership Agreement with the UAE ( effective since May 2015 )—are made within narrow circles of the appointed government and international financial institutions, without direct public referendums or sufficient transparency regarding how the benefits are distributed to citizens . This pattern of " top-down reform " achieves monetary stability ( inflation is low at around 1.6–2 %) . (Percentage thanks to pegging the dinar to the dollar ) but it does not solve the problem of fairness in the distribution of wealth, nor does it give the citizen any real control over public spending .

Monetary stability is not economic justice . A country can be monetaryly stable and socially impoverished at the same time — and that is exactly what is happening in Jordan today .

1.3 Water crisis : Jordan is among the world's poorest countries in terms of water resources.

No single crisis encapsulates the fragility of the Jordanian state like the water crisis . Jordan today is among the world's poorest countries in terms of per capita renewable water resources .

Water indicator	Data
Per capita share of water annually, year 2000	Approximately 3,400 cubic meter
Per capita share of water annually, today	About 80 Just one cubic meter — a decline of over 97% percent
Number of household water supply units in Amman	It is limited to about 24 up to 36 Just one hour per week
Percentage of water loss ( theft and network leakage )	More than 50 % of pumped water
Water consumption in the agricultural sector	About 60 % of total water resources
Unsustainable depletion of groundwater	More than 50 Percentage of groundwater pumping exceeds the natural recharge rate
Percentage of water resources shared with neighboring countries	About 40 Percentage ( Jordan River, Yarmouk, Disi )

The root cause is not just the refugee crisis, but decades of mismanagement, pricing without a payback cost for political reasons, and the lack of real investment in water desalination, rainwater harvesting, and irrigation efficiency before the crisis worsened .
Syrian refugees ( approximately 3 The million refugees and the historic Palestinian refugee crisis have increased the pressure on already limited resources, but independent reports confirm that " blaming the refugees " obscures the actual administrative and political responsibility for corruption and poor planning .
The disparities are stark : well-off families buy water from private tankers to compensate for the shortage, while poor families, most of whom are refugees and low-income families, do not have this option .
Jordan joined in February 2026 The UN Water Convention is a positive step in terms of regional cooperation, but it does not address the root of the internal problem related to governance, corruption and pricing .

1.4 Social situation : poverty, displacement, and unprecedented demographic pressure

Jordan hosts, relative to its population ( approximately 11.6 (One million people ) , one of the highest refugee densities in the world : approximately 2.2 One million registered Palestinian refugees, and about 1.3 One million Syrian refugees, in addition to numbers from Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and migrant workers from Egypt and South Asia .

The cost of hosting Syrian refugees alone is estimated at more than 5 billion dollars annually — or about 6 % of GDP and 25 Percentage of annual government revenue — Jordan itself bears about 63 Percent of them are without sufficient coverage from international aid .
In July 2025 The government has raised the fees for renewing work permits for Syrian refugees from 10 Dinars to more than 500 Dinar, which deepened the vulnerability of refugee families and pushed many towards the informal economy .
Around a quarter of the population lives below the poverty line, and the National Aid Fund supports more than 220 Thousands of Jordanian families were supported through the Unified Cash Transfer Program, which is a necessary but remedial, not structural, form of support .
Public health spending does not exceed approximately 6 % of GDP, down from 5.5 Percentage in 2011 , although the Social Security Corporation covers about 65% Percent of the workforce, including refugees and migrant workers .

Jordan does not suffer from a lack of humanitarian solidarity — rather, from the absence of a participatory mechanism that allows host communities and refugees themselves to participate in designing solutions that directly affect their daily lives .

1.5 Regional and security context : Fragile stability under mounting pressure

Jordan is geographically located at the crossroads of the most dangerous hotspots in the Middle East : borders with Israel, the occupied West Bank and Gaza, borders with unstable Syria, borders with Iraq, and is close to the explosive Iranian - Israeli arena .

The majority of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin, which makes any escalation in Gaza or the West Bank a direct Jordanian domestic issue, and not just a foreign policy matter .
The Kingdom adheres to the policy of the " Three No's ": no to an alternative homeland, no to the displacement of Palestinians, and no to abandoning the two-state solution — a policy that enjoys a rare broad popular consensus in Jordan .
The Jordanian government reinstated compulsory military service in 2026 Three decades after its suspension, in an indication of the state's readiness for escalating security scenarios .
" Prevention of Cybercrimes " Act of 2023 It has been used extensively to suppress expression and assembly, particularly during pro-Palestinian protests, and has also affected LGBTQ+ activists and independent associations, raising serious concerns about the space for civil liberties .
Hundreds of protesters were arrested during pro-Gaza demonstrations, although these protests reflected, according to activists, a level of popular mobilization exceeding the turnout in the parliamentary elections themselves .
The General Intelligence Directorate enjoys broad influence that sometimes exceeds the powers of Parliament and elected local institutions, and has received massive American security support since 2003 .

Between diplomatic balance and popular anger

The Jordanian government finds itself in an extremely difficult dilemma : maintaining the 1994 peace treaty with Israel for vital strategic, water, and security reasons, versus escalating public anger over the war in Gaza and settler violence in the West Bank . Any decision to terminate the treaty would expose Jordan to harsh US sanctions, including the suspension of vital economic and military aid . This complex equation requires precisely what DDS provides : a mechanism that enables Jordanian society to clearly express its will and actively participate in shaping the national position, without necessarily implying reckless unilateral decisions that could jeopardize the country's security—direct democracy, based on full knowledge and impartial information, produces wiser, not more impulsive, decisions .

1.6 Diagnostic summary

The structural crisis in Jordan can be summarized in one equation : excessive centralization of decision-making in the hands of a single institution ( the Palace ) , versus a near-total absence of mechanisms for direct and effective popular participation in decisions that affect citizens’ daily lives — water, jobs, the budget, security, and relations with neighbors .

This is not a moral judgment on the Hashemite family or on state institutions, but a structural diagnosis : any system that concentrates decision-making in one place, no matter how good its intentions, is by its very nature slow, prone to local corruption, and unable to accommodate the enormous diversity of society’s needs .
The solution is not to replace one institution with another similar centralized one ( a single party, a revolutionary council, or any other form of top-down authority ) , but rather an actual distribution of the ability to know, participate, and decide, starting from the popular base itself .

Jordan does not need a destructive revolution, but rather a new democratic infrastructure to be built alongside the existing state, gradually and peacefully, until it becomes the actual center of gravity for decision-making — this is exactly what the next part of this document proposes .

Part Two : The DirectDemocracy System — Structure and Philosophy

Before presenting the detailed program for each sector, it is necessary to explain the complete structure of the DDS system , which is a unified structure applied on the same principle in all countries of the world, with full adaptation to the cultural, religious and political particularities of each country — and in the case of Jordan, an adaptation that deeply respects the monarchy, the tribal fabric, the shared Palestinian - Jordanian identity, and the Islamic religion as an essential societal reference .

2.1 The four founding principles

Joint leadership ( Leadership Condivisa )

Not found in DDS Traditional individual or hierarchical leadership . Decisions are formulated and made collectively through a horizontal structure of interconnected subgroups ( fractal structure ) , where every documented member has an equal vote, and where no individual or entity can monopolize, inherit, or impose power from above .

Non-transferable collective ownership ( Proprietà Collettiva )

National resources and wealth—specifically in Jordan's case : water, phosphates and potash and their derivatives, public lands, the Port of Aqaba, and public financial resources—are managed within a framework of collective ownership. No government, company, or external entity can acquire, sell, or mortgage them without direct and transparent public consent through DDS mechanisms . This principle protects national wealth from hasty privatization or debt agreements that use national assets as collateral without the people's genuine knowledge .

Direct democracy

The decision does not pass through permanent intermediaries ( monopoly parties, closed parliaments, appointed councils ) but is made directly by documented citizens, through DDS platforms. Protected digital information, with the help of neutral and complete information provided by ddsAI systems. and allddsAI , with the active participation of small groups on the ground .

Permanent popular sovereignty over wealth and decision-making

This is the principle that DDS applies. In every country in the world, without exception : the wealth of every nation, and the power to decide its future, must forever remain the exclusive and undivided property of its people . No international loan, no trade agreement, no foreign influence, and not even a democratically elected government has the right to dispose of a nation's wealth or its future on behalf of its people without their direct and ongoing mandate .

2.2 Small groups : The structure that brings about change peacefully

Small groups are the building block of the DDS system , a tool that allows Jordanians to build a real popular decision-making authority without any confrontation with the existing state or its institutions .

Each subgroup consists of a limited number of citizens ( usually between 5 and 15 Members ) who share a residential neighborhood, village, workplace, university, or common interest ( such as groups specializing in water, agriculture, refugee rights, or entrepreneurship ).
The smaller groups are intertwined in an ascending fractal structure : neighborhood groups connect with city groups, which connect with governorate groups ( Amman, Irbid, Zarqa, Karak, Ma’an, Aqaba, etc. ) , all the way up to the national level, without any group at the base losing its voice or independence .
Each group elects from among its members, on a periodic and immediately revocable basis ( no permanent mandate ) , who represents it at the highest level, through a transparent mechanism documented via the three-coded identity system .
Participation in the microgroups does not require any prior party, religious or tribal affiliation, and is open to every Jordanian man and woman, including Jordanians of Palestinian origin, registered refugees ( in an advisory capacity until obtaining citizenship or permanent residency ) , Christian, Circassian and Chechen minorities, and supporters of any political current, including currents currently banned from official party work .

In Jordan specifically, where many are afraid to get involved in formal political parties because of a long history of institutional intimidation, small groups provide a safe and non-confrontational alternative : no formal party registration, no direct confrontation with the state, but rather a gradual and quiet building of real grassroots organizational capacity, from the bottom up .

Why is this model peaceful by nature?

The smaller groups do not seek to overthrow the throne or existing institutions, but rather to build a parallel channel for direct popular participation, which the state institutions themselves can deal with as a real advisory and executive partner over time .
The decision is made by consensus and internal voting, not by public pressure or demonstrations, although the right to peaceful demonstration remains guaranteed and supported as a fundamental right .
The complete transparency of every decision and every vote ( via the three-character identity system ) makes it impossible for groups to be hijacked by an extremist movement or an external party, as every step is documented and subject to review by all members .

2.3 ddsAI and allddsAI : Complete, neutral, and independent knowledge for every citizen

One of the biggest reasons for the failure of democratic experiments in the region is the knowledge gap between decision-makers and citizens, and the dominance of biased media ( governmental, partisan, or foreign ) in shaping public opinion . This gap is addressed through two interconnected systems :

ddsAI : An AI system tailored to each microgroup and each member, providing a neutral and data-driven analysis of every issue up for voting — whether it be water pricing, a municipal budget, or a stance on a trade agreement — in clear Arabic and accessible to everyone regardless of their education level .
allddsAI : A framework for " AI democracy , " where AI systems operating within DDS are treated As official members with defined rights and responsibilities, they are subject to collective oversight by users, ensuring that no party—not a tech company, not a government, not even DDS— can interfere. The same applies—directing these systems to serve a narrow agenda . The final decision always remains with humans; artificial intelligence informs, it does not rule .

For Jordan, this practically means that a farmer in the Jordan Valley facing a decision about his water share receives the same quality of information and depth of analysis as a government official or international expert — information independent of both internal political pressures and the agendas of external donors .

2.4 NTCO : The Trusted Transparency and Coordination Authority

NTCO It is the regulatory body within the DDS Tasked with ensuring transparency, trust, and coordination among smaller groups at various levels , its primary function in the Jordanian context includes :

Independent verification of the integrity of every vote and every collective decision, free from any governmental, partisan or external interference .
Coordination between different groups ( for example, between water groups in multiple governorates that share the same resources ) to avoid conflict and ensure fair distribution .
Documenting and archiving each decision in a way that makes it impossible to tamper with, thus preserving the institutional memory of the groups and protecting it from attempts to rewrite or deny it later .

2.5 GUMI-SV : The unified global infrastructure for resource management and community verification

GUMI-SV It is the unified global system within DDS The concern is with the management of collective resources and the social verification of decisions across all the countries in which DDS operates , ensuring that the same principles — collective ownership, transparency, and the non-transferability of national wealth without popular consent — are applied in full harmony in Jordan as in any other country, with full respect for national sovereignty and local particularities of each decision .

2.6 Three-digit identity system : secure sharing, complete privacy protection

To ensure that popular participation is completely safe—especially in a political context like Jordan where a large segment of the population fears security or professional intimidation because of their political views— DDS relies on Three-character identity system :

The first code ( Verification ID ): proves that the member is a real and unique person ( to prevent double voting or fake accounts ) , without revealing their full civil identity to the rest of the system .
The second symbol ( participant ID ): It is used within the small group for daily interaction and voting, and members of the same group can know each other if they choose to do so voluntarily, but it is technically separate from official government records .
The third symbol ( protection identity ): An additional layer of protection that is automatically activated in politically and security-sensitive situations — such as voting on positions on politically or religiously controversial issues — to ensure that no party, including local or foreign security agencies, can link a citizen’s opinion to their real name without an independent and transparent judicial process .

In a country like Jordan, where the cybercrime law has been used to persecute dissenting voices and pro-Palestinian demonstrators, a three-tiered protection system becomes not a technological luxury but an existential necessity to ensure genuine and safe participation for every citizen without fear of reprisal .

2.7 Protection against manipulation and multimedia brainwashing

DDS platforms Designed to be structurally immune to media manipulation and targeted propaganda, whether its source is governmental, partisan, or from regional or international powers seeking to steer Jordanian public opinion to serve their own agendas ( a highly sensitive context in a region witnessing an intense information war on the issues of Gaza, Iran, and Israel ):

All information is displayed to members via ddsAI It is accompanied by its full sources and an analysis of its credibility, presenting multiple and competing viewpoints on controversial issues, not a single opinion presented as absolute truth .
There are no paid advertisements and no algorithms that prioritize certain content based on who pays more — unlike commercial social media platforms that are often exploited to amplify polarization .
and ongoing analysis of targeted information warfare attempts against small groups, with immediate alerts to members when coordinated disinformation campaigns are detected .
Technical and operational independence of DDS platforms On behalf of any government, media company, or intelligence agency, whether local or foreign .

Part Three : The detailed program, sector by sector

This section presents, for each vital sector in Jordan, a concise diagnosis followed by the solution proposed by the DDS system , with concrete examples and a clear forecast of the desired results . The aim is not to make general promises, but rather to provide actionable mechanisms that can be implemented immediately and gradually .

3.1 Political sector : A peaceful, gradual, and secure transition towards genuine popular sovereignty.

Governing principle

DDS It does not call for the overthrow of the Hashemite throne or for confrontation with the Jordanian state, nor does it impose a ready-made political model from abroad . The goal is to build a parallel democratic infrastructure, starting from the popular base, gradually expanding, and allowing Jordanians of all backgrounds—loyalists and opponents, Jordanians of Palestinian origin and East Jordanian tribes, Muslims and Christians, Circassians and Chechens, men and women—to participate directly in decisions that affect their lives, without any form of violence, coup, or destabilization .

Full and lasting respect for the Hashemite institution and its historical and religious symbolism as an integral part of Jordan’s national and regional identity, including its role in the custodianship of the Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem .
Full respect for the tribal fabric and for Jordanian customs and traditions, which are a historical form of collective consultation that the structure of small groups can complement, not abolish .
Full protection of the right of every opposition political movement to organize, express itself and participate through smaller groups — including Islamic, leftist, nationalist, liberal and independent movements — without the need for official party registration that would expose them to intimidation or prohibition .
Complete neutrality towards internal ideological disputes : DDS It does not endorse or oppose any particular political current ( including the controversy surrounding the banning of the Muslim Brotherhood ) , but rather provides all currents with an equal, safe, and protected platform for participation from the three-symbol identity system .
Special and enhanced protection for the participation of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who constitute a majority or close to a majority of the population but are historically relatively underrepresented in decision-making institutions due to the drawing of electoral districts; the structure of the smaller groups is not subject to this geographical bias because it is built from the ground up regardless of the boundaries of the official districts .
Equal and guaranteed protection of the rights of religious and ethnic minorities : Christians, Circassians, Chechens, and any other component, ensuring an independent voice not conditioned by the traditional parliamentary quota alone .

The mechanism for a peaceful transition in practice

How can the Jordanian people gain genuine decision-making power without confrontation, and without elections that might be disrupted or manipulated as has happened historically? Through three overlapping stages :

The consultative phase : Establishing small groups in neighborhoods, villages, universities and workplaces, starting with discussions of daily local issues ( water pricing, quality of municipal services, local job opportunities ) and issuing public and documented recommendations, without any legal conflict with existing frameworks .
The actual partnership phase : With the accumulation of trust and credibility, municipalities and elected local councils begin to deal with the recommendations of the subgroups as a formal, morally binding consultative input, through documented voluntary partnership agreements .
The stage of direct popular sovereignty : With the maturation of the national network of microgroups and its coverage of the majority of governorates, the decisions issued by them ( through protected and neutral direct popular referendums ) become the actual reference for public decision, in parallel with the existing constitutional institutions, which can then gradually develop towards granting broader executive powers to the direct popular will without constitutional or institutional conflict .

There's no need to tear something down in order to build something better . DDS It builds something parallel to the state, not against it, until the parallel becomes the original due to accumulated popular trust, not due to confrontation .

Concrete examples and expected consequences

The current problem	DDS solution	Expected result
The Senate is entirely appointed ( 65 Member ) without any direct connection to the popular will .	Small national groups issue a documented and public " parallel public opinion " on every piece of legislation that passes through the Senate, which is published publicly before the parliamentary vote .	A growing moral and political pressure is gradually pushing towards reforming the council's structure or reducing its actual powers in favor of the documented popular will .
Electoral participation not exceeding 30 One percent due to a loss of confidence in the usefulness of voting .	Daily and continuous participation through small groups in tangible and direct decisions ( water, local services, municipal budgets ) , not just a symbolic vote every four years .	A gradual rebuilding of confidence in the usefulness of political participation, because it becomes an immediate and tangible impact on daily life .
The Muslim Brotherhood was banned in April 2025 It deprives a large segment of society of organized political representation .	The microgroups platform is completely neutral and open to all voices, including supporters of banned movements, within a secure legal framework that does not require formal party registration .	Releasing political tension through a legitimate and safe channel of participation, instead of pushing this segment towards clandestine activity or extremism due to exclusion .
Electoral districts are historically drawn to reduce the representative weight of areas with a high Palestinian population .	The smaller groups are built on the basis of the actual neighborhood and community, not the official electoral boundaries, and reflect the true demographic weight .	A more equitable representation that is consistent with the actual demographic composition, without the need to formally redraw the constituencies and the accompanying political sensitivities .

3.2 The economic and financial sector : From imposed austerity to a direct popular decision on wealth

Governing principle

Jordan's public debt and the associated austerity programs are not inevitable, but rather the result of decisions made without genuine public participation in setting public spending priorities or in overseeing the performance of loss-making state-owned enterprises . It does not propose debt cancellation or a reckless, unilateral confrontation with international creditors, but rather something more effective : complete transparency and a direct popular decision on how revenues are generated and spent, in a way that achieves genuine distributive justice without compromising existing monetary stability .

A fully transparent general budget, where any small group can view every item in it via ddsAI , with a simplified analysis of each item and its direct impact on the citizen .
Direct and continuous public oversight of the performance of loss-making government companies ( National Electricity Company, Water Authority ) , through small specialized groups comprising engineers, economists and ordinary citizens, recommending concrete administrative reform plans instead of simply passing the losses on to the general budget .
Direct and protected public referendums on major public spending priorities ( e.g. , should additional revenues be directed towards supporting youth employment, water infrastructure, or debt reduction? ) , instead of these choices being decided exclusively within closed government circles .
Small groups specializing in entrepreneurship and employment, connecting unemployed youth ( more than 40) % of young people ( with real opportunities in promising sectors such as renewable energy, digital services, and pharmaceuticals, with analytical support from ddsAI) To identify the actual gaps in the labor market .
Activating the principle of permanent popular sovereignty over national wealth in every major international economic agreement ( such as the comprehensive partnership agreement with the UAE, or any future agreement ) , so that its basic clauses and expected effects are presented to the relevant smaller groups before the final signing, not after .

Concrete examples and expected consequences

The current problem	DDS solution	Expected result
Annual losses for the electricity company and the water authority are close to 2 Percent of the GDP, financed by public funds without direct public accountability .	Small, specialized technical groups ( engineers, accountants, citizens ) publicly review the causes of the losses on a monthly basis and propose reform plans that are put to a local public vote before being adopted .	A gradual and tangible reduction in losses over 3 up to 5 Years, through continuous accountability instead of passing the bill annually to taxpayers without oversight .
Youth unemployment exceeds 40 Percentage despite a relative increase in university education rates .	A national platform run by specialized micro-groups that directly links the skills of registered graduates with real opportunities in the private sector and small businesses, with participatory funding support proposed by the groups themselves .	A gradual and tangible reduction in youth unemployment through a more accurate match between supply and demand in the labor market, instead of adopting general employment policies isolated from the local reality .
Austerity measures and fee increases ( such as raising work permit fees for refugees by more than 50%) Weakness ) is taken without consulting the directly affected groups .	Any austerity decision or major fee increase is first presented to the directly affected microgroups ( workers, small business owners, refugees registered as consultative members ) before its implementation, along with proposed alternatives from ddsAI .	More balanced and fair economic decisions, avoiding sudden social shocks and maintaining the stability of the informal labor market .

3.3 Water and natural resources : From an existential crisis to transparent public management

Governing principle

Water in Jordan is not a commercial commodity, but an existential right that must be managed according to the logic of popular collective ownership, with full transparency, and with the direct participation of the affected communities in every decision related to its pricing, distribution, and investment .

Small, specialized water groups in each governorate ( Amman, Irbid, Mafraq, Zarqa, Karak and the Jordan Valley in particular ) comprising farmers, water engineers and citizens, directly monitor the quantities of pumping, distribution and losses in their local network through open data provided by the Water Authority in cooperation with DDS .
A direct and secure public reporting system ( protected by a three-digit identity system ) for cases of water theft or corruption in distribution, guaranteeing the whistleblower full protection from any retaliation, with transparent follow-up for each report until it is resolved .
Direct local referendums on the priorities for investing water tariff revenues : desalination, rainwater harvesting, network maintenance, or supporting low-income families? Instead of these priorities being decided exclusively by a central decision .
A fair, progressive water tariff formulated with the participation of the micro-groups themselves : a basic consumption fully subsidized for each household, and a gradually higher price for excess consumption ( swimming pools, large gardens ) , instead of generalizing subsidies or raising prices by a sudden top-down decision .
Direct popular participation in shaping Jordan’s negotiating position on shared water resources with its neighbors ( Yarmouk River, Disi, Jordan River ) , by providing negotiators with a documented popular mandate that reflects the priorities of the directly affected communities, not just central diplomatic calculations .

Concrete examples and expected consequences

The current problem	DDS solution	Expected result
More than 50 A percentage of the pumped water is lost due to theft and network leaks, without any effective public oversight .	Local microgroups monitor pumping and distribution data weekly via an open dashboard from ddsAI , and immediately report any leaks or documented theft points .	A tangible and gradual reduction in the percentage of water loss within a few years, through continuous decentralized monitoring instead of relying on centralized inspection with limited resources .
My home's water supply does not exceed 24 up to 36 One hour per week in the capital, Amman .	A direct public referendum in each region regarding the priority of distributing the available quantities ( complete equality between neighborhoods or priority for the most needy areas ) , with full transparency regarding the actual quantities available .	A greater sense of fairness in distribution, even in the face of existing scarcity, and a decrease in complaints regarding favoritism towards certain regions at the expense of others .
Agriculture consumes 60 Percent of water resources are used with low irrigation efficiency in many areas .	Specialized small-scale agricultural groups, with analytical support from ddsAI , are developing local plans for a gradual shift towards drip irrigation and less water-intensive farming, with direct financial incentives proposed by the farmers themselves .	A gradual improvement in the efficiency of agricultural water use without imposing centralized decisions that harm the livelihoods of farmers without fair compensation .

3.4 Social sector : Dignity for Jordanian citizens, and sustainable humanitarian protection for refugees

Governing principle

Jordan bears an unprecedented historical humanitarian burden relative to its population size, and this burden should not be resolved at the expense of the average Jordanian citizen or the dignity of the refugee . It proposes a participatory mechanism that includes host communities and the refugees themselves in designing solutions, instead of policies imposed from above without consulting both parties .

Small mixed groups in areas with high refugee density ( Irbid, Mafraq, Zarqa, Greater Amman camps ) comprising Jordanian citizens and refugees registered in an advisory capacity, to determine the priorities of shared local services ( schools, clinics, water networks ) with full transparency regarding the resources actually available .
A transparent public review of decisions such as raising work permit fees for refugees, by presenting the full impact of these decisions ( economically and socially ) on the affected microgroups, with the proposal of gradual alternatives that protect the stability of the informal labor market from sudden collapse .
A gradual and transparent expansion of the unified cash transfer program ( National Aid Fund ) by identifying the actual beneficiaries with the participation of local microgroups that know the most needy cases more accurately than any central database far removed from daily reality .
Direct and transparent support for small host community initiatives ( cooperatives, family businesses ) through participatory funding proposed by the micro-groups themselves, instead of relying exclusively on international donor programs that may not take into account precise local priorities .
Special and enhanced protection of women’s rights within the structure of microgroups, by guaranteeing equal and safe representation, especially in the most socially conservative areas, through voting mechanisms protected by a three-symbol identity system that preserves women’s privacy and safety within their family and community .

Concrete examples and expected consequences

The current problem	DDS solution	Expected result
Work permit fees for Syrian refugees increased from 10 Dinars to more than 500 One dinar payment pushed many towards informal work .	Mixed mini-groups propose a gradual fee schedule linked to the actual income level, with full transparency about the expected impact on both the formal and informal labor market .	Reducing migration towards the informal economy, and increasing the state's actual revenues through higher compliance rates instead of nominally higher rates that are not actually collected .
About a quarter of the population is below the poverty line, with centralized support programs that do not always reach the most deserving cases .	Small local groups, who know the actual circumstances of the neighbors, participate in transparent field verification of eligibility criteria before final beneficiaries are approved in the cash transfer program .	More accurate and equitable access to social support for those who actually deserve it, and a reduction in cases of wrong exclusion or undeserved inclusion .

3.5 Education and health : an investment in human capital that translates into real opportunities.

Governing principle

Jordan has relatively high education rates, but this investment is partly wasted due to the gap between education outputs and actual labor market needs, and due to the relative decline in public health spending despite relatively broad social coverage through the Social Security Corporation .

Small local educational groups, comprising teachers, parents and students, periodically and transparently assess the quality of the curricula and their relevance to actual job opportunities available locally and regionally, and submit recommendations directly to the Ministry of Education .
ddsAI data Neutrality regarding actual labor market gaps ( renewable energy, health, technology, tourism sectors ) in university and career pathways, to guide students towards more realistic options before they graduate, not after .
Small local health groups monitor the quality of service in health centers and government hospitals and report actual shortages ( medicines, equipment, staff ) directly through a transparent channel that reaches decision-makers without slow bureaucratic mediation .
A gradual and transparent expansion of health social security coverage to include the most vulnerable groups ( informal sector workers, unregistered refugees ) , with priorities determined with the participation of directly concerned local microgroups instead of a central decision isolated from the field reality .

Concrete examples and expected consequences

The current problem	DDS solution	Expected result
High unemployment among university graduates despite high enrollment rates in higher education .	ddsAI platform A guidance that directly links actual labor market gaps with study pathways, with a transparent monthly update of actual skills demand data .	A gradual convergence between educational outputs and market needs, and a relative decline in unemployment among new graduates during upcoming educational cycles .
Public health spending fell to 2.6 % of GDP compared to 5.5 Previously, a certain percentage, with frequent complaints about shortages of medicines and equipment in government centers .	Small local health groups report monthly and with complete transparency the actual deficiencies in each health facility, with public monitoring of the government's response rate to each report .	Measurable improvement in the quality of local health services, and clearer accountability for the actual allocation of available health resources .

3.6 Justice, combating corruption, and protecting civil liberties

Governing principle

Full transparency is the most powerful tool for combating corruption, and protecting civil liberties is an indispensable foundation for any genuine public participation . DDS It does not call for the repeal of the Cybercrime Prevention Law or other existing legal frameworks, but rather proposes a parallel mechanism that practically protects citizens from the misuse of these frameworks .

Independent and secure public documentation ( protected by a third identity code ) of suspected legal prosecutions targeting peaceful expression or human rights activism, with impartial analysis from ddsAI For its compliance with international human rights standards .
Small, specialized legal groups ( volunteer lawyers, human rights activists, citizens ) provide free and safe legal advice to any citizen facing persecution for a political opinion or peaceful activity, without any prior ideological bias towards any movement .
A direct and secure public reporting system for local administrative corruption cases ( public procurement, licenses, resource allocation ) , with full and documented protection of the whistleblower’s identity through a three-coded identity system and transparent follow-up for each report until it is resolved .
A periodic and transparent public review of the performance of local authorities ( municipalities, service departments ) through surveys and direct evaluations from small groups, the results of which are published publicly as a tool of moral pressure towards administrative reform without political confrontation .

Concrete examples and expected consequences

The current problem	DDS solution	Expected result
Extensive use of the cybercrime law against demonstrators and activists during pro-Palestinian protests .	Independent and transparent documentation of every prosecution case, with immediate free legal support from DDS Groups. Specialized legal expertise, and publishing a neutral analysis of each case without political bias .	Greater effective protection for peaceful protesters, and cumulative pressure towards a more balanced use of the law that respects freedom of expression without compromising the actual security of the state .
Widespread administrative corruption in the water and public procurement sector without effective and secure public reporting channels .	A fully protected public reporting platform that allows any citizen to document a case of corruption without fear of retaliation, with public monitoring of the institutional response rate for each report .	A gradual increase in the number of reported and resolved corruption cases, and a growing deterrent effect on local corrupt practices .

3.7 Foreign policy and regional security : A documented public voice without adventurism

Governing principle

On highly sensitive issues such as relations with Israel, the stance on the Gaza and West Bank wars, and regional security coordination, DDS does not propose Unilateral and reckless decisions could jeopardize the security of the Jordanian state . Rather, he proposes a mechanism that allows the Jordanian government and negotiators to ascertain the true and accurately documented public opinion, independent of the noise of social media or regional media misinformation, thus strengthening the hand of Jordanian diplomacy rather than weakening it .

Periodic and protected public opinion polls ( via the three-coded identity system ) on Jordanian foreign policy priorities are presented as a confidential and documented advisory input to the government, without publishing details that may be exploited in the media or diplomatically against the national interest .
Neutral and ongoing analysis by ddsAI Targeted media disinformation campaigns aimed at Jordanian public opinion on sensitive regional issues ( whether originating from regional or international parties ) , with immediate alert to small groups .
Small groups specializing in national food and energy security monitor and transparently discuss the extent of Jordan’s dependence on Israeli gas and energy within the water-for-energy agreement, and propose gradual alternatives to enhance national energy sovereignty ( solar energy, alternative regional projects ) without a sudden break that could jeopardize stability .
A direct and secure advisory channel for communities and societies directly affected by border tensions ( border areas with Syria and the West Bank ) , to ensure that their security and livelihood concerns are taken into account in any security or diplomatic decision that directly concerns them .

Concrete examples and expected consequences

The current problem	DDS solution	Expected result
There is a wide gap between the official, reserved stance on ending the peace treaty with Israel and the rising public anger over the Gaza war .	A documented and confidential popular advisory channel that conveys the actual size and nature of the popular position of the Jordanian negotiators, strengthening their negotiating position with accurate knowledge instead of guesswork or relying solely on social media accounts .	A foreign policy more in line with the actual popular will, without risking hasty unilateral decisions that could jeopardize national security .
The heavy reliance on Israeli gas and energy under the water-for-energy agreement is causing widespread public sensitivity .	Specialized small energy groups develop a gradual and transparent national plan to expand local solar energy ( in which Jordan has huge natural potential ) , with direct participation from local communities in determining project locations and distributing their returns .	A gradual strengthening of national energy sovereignty and a reduction of politically sensitive dependencies, through a practical path that avoids sudden ruptures that threaten economic stability .

Part Four : The Implementation Roadmap

It is proposed that this program be implemented through four overlapping and realistically timed phases, taking into account the specificity of the Jordanian context and its political and regional sensitivities, without any reckless timetable that may endanger the participants or the general stability .

Phase One : Foundation ( Year One to Year Two )

Launching the first small groups in university neighborhoods and more open urban areas ( Amman, Irbid, Zarqa ) , focusing on tangible local issues that are not politically controversial : water quality, municipal services, local employment opportunities .
Initial training for local coordinators on using ddsAI platforms The three-symbol identity system, in simplified Arabic and accessible to different educational levels .
Building an initial network of specialized micro-groups ( water, youth employment, education ) in the governorates most affected by the crises mentioned in this document .

Phase Two : Expansion ( Years Two to Four )

Expanding the network to include rural areas and more distant governorates ( Karak, Ma’an, Tafila, Aqaba, Jordan Valley ) , with special adaptation to the issues of each region ( agriculture in the Jordan Valley, tourism in Aqaba and Petra ).
The actual consultative partnership phase with municipalities and elected local councils has begun, through voluntary agreements to provide recommendations from small groups as a formal entry point to local decision-making .
Launching mixed microgroups in densely populated refugee areas ( Irbid, Mafraq ) , with the participation of registered refugees alongside the host community .
Activating a secure public reporting system for administrative corruption and controversial legal cases, while building a documented and transparent public record of institutional response rates .

Stage Three : Rooting ( Years Four to Seven )

Comprehensive national coverage for all Jordanian governorates, with a vertically integrated network of microgroups from the neighborhood level to the national level .
Activating direct and protected popular referendums as a regular tool for consultation on major economic, water and social decisions, with the dissemination of their results as a moral and political reference gradually recognized by official institutions .
Developing the secret consultative channel for formulating public opinion on sensitive foreign policy issues, to become an implicitly recognized entry point for diplomatic decision-makers .

Stage Four : Mature Popular Sovereignty ( from the seventh year onwards )

Decisions issued by the National Network of Small Groups become the de facto and recognized reference for public decision-making on major local and economic issues, in full parallel with existing constitutional institutions .
A gradual and potentially peaceful evolution of existing constitutional institutions ( the powers of the House of Representatives, the mechanism for forming the government ) towards greater harmony with the direct popular will documented through the DDS , without any constitutional or institutional clash, and through a voluntary initiative from the institutions themselves based on accumulated popular trust .

No rigid timetable imposed from the outside : the speed of each phase is determined by the actual level of public trust accumulated on the ground, not by the desire of DDS. In expediting the process , safety and security are more important than speed .

Part Five : Expected Results

Implementing this program, in the gradual and peaceful manner described above, is expected to achieve the following results within a realistic time horizon of seven to ten years :

5.1 On the political level

Daily and actual popular participation far exceeds the thirty percent limit of current electoral participation, because participation through small groups is continuous and linked to tangible issues, not to the symbolism of periodic voting .
More equitable representation that is in harmony with the actual demographic composition of the country, including Jordanians of Palestinian origin and religious and ethnic minorities .
There is a gradual decline in the level of violent political polarization, because all currents, including those officially banned, find a safe and protected channel for participation instead of the complete exclusion that fuels extremism .

5.2 On the economic and financial level

A gradual and tangible reduction in the losses of government companies through continuous public oversight, which will positively impact the overall budget deficit without the need for further harsh austerity programs imposed from abroad .
A gradual decline in youth unemployment rates through a more accurate match between education outputs and actual labor market opportunities .
More equitable and transparent public spending decisions enjoy wider public acceptance because they are the result of direct participation, not top-down imposition .

5.3 Regarding water and natural resources

A tangible and gradual reduction in the percentage of water loss ( from more than 50%) Currently, (percentage ) through continuous decentralized public oversight of local networks .
A fairer and more transparent distribution of scarce water resources among different regions and social groups .
A gradual shift towards more water-efficient agricultural practices, with voluntary participation from the farmers themselves, not by coercive imposition .

5.4 On the social and humanitarian level

Greater stability for refugee-hosting communities through participatory mechanisms that take into account the interests of both parties, instead of unilateral policies that create tension between communities .
More accurate and equitable access for social support programs to those who actually deserve them .
Broader and more effective protection of the rights of women and vulnerable groups through safe and secure participation mechanisms under the three-coded identity system .

5.5 On the regional and security level

A foreign policy more in line with the actual popular will strengthens the hand of Jordanian diplomacy with accurate and documented knowledge instead of guesswork .
A gradual strengthening of national energy and water sovereignty, thereby reducing Jordan’s geopolitical vulnerability to volatile regional pressures .
Maintaining full security and institutional stability, as the proposed transformation is entirely cumulative and peaceful and does not involve any confrontation with the state or its institutions .

Conclusion : A call for partnership, not confrontation.

This document is not a call to overthrow anything, but rather a call to build something new alongside what already exists : a democratic infrastructure that allows every Jordanian, regardless of political, religious, ethnic, or geographical affiliation, to participate directly and daily in determining the fate of their country and its resources . He believes that Jordan, with its educated people, strategic location and relative stability, has all the elements to achieve this transformation in complete peace, if it is given the appropriate tools .

Jordan’s wealth—its water, its phosphates, its land, and the future of its sons and daughters—must forever remain the sole property of the Jordanian people . The power to decide on this future must be returned, gradually, peacefully, and with growing confidence, to the people themselves . This is the essence of the DirectDemocracy movement’s call. Today it is a day for Jordan, and for all the peoples of the world .

Shared leadership . Collective ownership . Direct democracy . Logic, common sense, and truth . These are not slogans, but daily working tools established by DDS. In the hands of the Jordanian people, today .

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Program for Jordan

Index

Executive Introduction

DDS methodology

Why Jordan? And why now?

Part One : A Critical Analysis of the Current Situation

1.1 Political system : Executive monarchy under a parliamentary guise

The paradox of suspended reform

Corruption and weak local governance

1.2 Economics and Public Finance : The Spiral of Debt and External Dependence

A fragile and unproductive economic structure

Who holds the economic decision-making power?

1.3 Water crisis : Jordan is among the world's poorest countries in terms of water resources.

1.4 Social situation : poverty, displacement, and unprecedented demographic pressure

1.5 Regional and security context : Fragile stability under mounting pressure

Between diplomatic balance and popular anger

1.6 Diagnostic summary

Part Two : The DirectDemocracy System — Structure and Philosophy

2.1 The four founding principles

Joint leadership ( Leadership Condivisa )

Non-transferable collective ownership ( Proprietà Collettiva )

Direct democracy

Permanent popular sovereignty over wealth and decision-making

2.2 Small groups : The structure that brings about change peacefully

Why is this model peaceful by nature?

2.3 ddsAI and allddsAI : Complete, neutral, and independent knowledge for every citizen

2.4 NTCO : The Trusted Transparency and Coordination Authority

2.5 GUMI-SV : The unified global infrastructure for resource management and community verification

2.6 Three-digit identity system : secure sharing, complete privacy protection

2.7 Protection against manipulation and multimedia brainwashing

Part Three : The detailed program, sector by sector

3.1 Political sector : A peaceful, gradual, and secure transition towards genuine popular sovereignty.

Governing principle

The mechanism for a peaceful transition in practice

Concrete examples and expected consequences

3.2 The economic and financial sector : From imposed austerity to a direct popular decision on wealth

Governing principle

Concrete examples and expected consequences

3.3 Water and natural resources : From an existential crisis to transparent public management

Governing principle

Concrete examples and expected consequences

3.4 Social sector : Dignity for Jordanian citizens, and sustainable humanitarian protection for refugees

Governing principle

Concrete examples and expected consequences

3.5 Education and health : an investment in human capital that translates into real opportunities.

Governing principle

Concrete examples and expected consequences

3.6 Justice, combating corruption, and protecting civil liberties

Governing principle

Concrete examples and expected consequences

3.7 Foreign policy and regional security : A documented public voice without adventurism

Governing principle

Concrete examples and expected consequences

Part Four : The Implementation Roadmap

Phase One : Foundation ( Year One to Year Two )

Phase Two : Expansion ( Years Two to Four )

Stage Three : Rooting ( Years Four to Seven )

Stage Four : Mature Popular Sovereignty ( from the seventh year onwards )

Part Five : Expected Results

5.1 On the political level

5.2 On the economic and financial level

5.3 Regarding water and natural resources

5.4 On the social and humanitarian level

5.5 On the regional and security level

Conclusion : A call for partnership, not confrontation.

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